Arrested development : growth theory has come a long way. How much further can it go? by Doug Campbell
W
ouldn’t it be great if there
was a recipe for growth?
Not personal growth, as
in conquering one’s fears of, say, public
speaking. Economic growth is what
we’re talking about. It is hard to over-
state the potential usefulness of a
formula that governments could fol-
low to ensure good health and riches
for their citizens: Sift together two
parts savings, three parts capital
investment, and one heaping part of
incentives for innovation. Bake for
two generations and voila: a fully
developed, fast-growing country.
As it happens, such a recipe exists.
In fact, there are many different 
varieties. We will discuss all of these
in more detail later, but in brief 
(and at the risk of oversimplifying),
there are two main contenders. First
is the “neoclassical theory of growth,”
in which economic output depends
on quantities of capital mixed with
labor force efficiency. Then we have
the “new growth theory,” in which
continual technological innovation
has been built into the model itself,
instead of being treated as an 
“exogenous” factor largely outside
anybody’s control.
There is some disagreement over
which one of these theories most
closely describes the real world — or
whether either comes close to doing
so. Moreover, it’s been 20 years since
the last big advance in growth theory,
with many recent contributions call-
ing attention to its weaknesses.
This gives rise to the question: Is
growth theory stunted? To be sure, you
could ask the same about many topics
in economics. But growth is probably
the biggest economic question of
them all: Why do some countries pros-
per while others stagnate? For many
economists, finding an answer to that
question is the main reason they
became economists in the first place.
Flying Solow
Acurrent economics textbook will tell
you that growth is produced by reshuf-
fling resources in ways that make those
resources more valuable. Although it
might seem intuitive that a nation
with an abundance of natural
resources, like oil, would prosper while
those deficient in such resources
would stagnate, this is not the case.
Consider the small island of Japan, for
example, whose growth rate in the
past 50 years caught up with the 
natural resource-rich United States
and whose citizens now are about 
as wealthy. By organizing resources
ranging from physical to intellectual
capital and combining them with
some sort of capital investment,
growth can happen in otherwise 
naturally inhospitable environments.
The trick is to hit upon the right 
combination of resources, especially
for developing countries whose eco-
nomies can’t seem to right themselves.
Growth theory began to take off
around the mid-20th century. In his
recent book, Knowledge and the Wealth
of Nations, David Warsh describes how
Robert Solow woke up the economics
profession to a novel theory of growth.
In two papers, 1956’s  “A Contribution
to the Theory of Economic Growth,”
and its 1957 follow-up, “Technical
Change and the Aggregate Production
Function,” Solow zeroed in on the
notion that technical change, more so
than capital investment or savings, was
at the heart of economic growth. That
is because technical change was found
to be the key in increasing produc-
tivity; nothing else had that effect in
the long run. “Here was the answer to
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Economists have long recognized that possessing natural resources does not guarantee economic success. Nigeria, which has 
abundant oil and natural gas reserves, remains mired in poverty, while Hong Kong, which has virtually no natural resources, 
is one of the wealthiest places on earth. What’s more puzzling is why certain policy distortions — ranging from price instability
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climbing the mountain of diminishing
returns,” Warsh wrote. “It had rela-
tively little to do with labor or capital
accumulation. ‘Technical progress …
was creating the new wealth.’”
At its simplest, the Solow model
says that, yes, investments in capital
and labor can spur growth. But these
gains are transitory because of dimin-
ishing returns — the problem that,
after awhile, productivity doesn’t
improve as much with the addition of,
say, the same type of computer. The
only thing that propels growth over
the long haul is technological change
— be it in creating a more powerful
antibiotic or in building a smaller
memory chip. 
It was a useful theory. With the
Solow model, one could pose ques-
tions and view the results. Should
public policy provide incentives so
that people save 2 percent more of
their income each year? The model
predicts what the long-range, overall
impact of economic output would be
from this policy prescription.
Soon enough, Solow’s basic model
was modified into a neoclassical 
theory. Among other tweaks, the most
important extension from the Solow
model was that savings moved to the
inside; with Solow, savings — like tech-
nological change — had been treated
as exogenous. (To economists, “exoge-
nous” means a factor that is injected
from a model’s outside. By contrast,
“endogenous” refers to variables that
are determined from things happening
inside the model.)
The exogenous nature of the Solow
and neoclassical models remained
their big flaw. By treating technologi-
cal change as exogenous, the models
say the very driver of economic growth
is not an internal component in the
model; it is something injected more
or less arbitrarily from the outside.
Though policy could affect the growth
rate during the transition period,
eventually policy is ineffective as
nations reach their long-run (or steady
state) growth rate. Additionally, the
neoclassical model assumes that tech-
nological skill is the same in all
countries, which obviously doesn’t fit
with the real-world experience.
Bennett McCallum, an economist
at Carnegie Mellon University and a
visiting scholar with the Richmond
Fed, summed up the neoclassical
model’s failings in a 1996 paper: “It
fails to explain even the most basic
facts of actual growth behavior,”
McCallum wrote. “The model itself
suggests either the same growth rate
for all economies or, depending on
one’s interpretation, different values
about which it has nothing to say.”
Thus, in the neoclassical models,
policy is impotent in influencing
growth once nations reach their steady
state. Likewise, the model’s main com-
ponents — capital and labor — didn’t
explain long-run growth either. It is all
about randomly given technical
change. As a guide for policymakers,
its powers are limited.
So the largest hole remained the
same: How do you encourage techno-
logical change? More precisely, how do
you get technological change inside a
growth model?
New Growth Theory
It wasn’t until the mid-1980s, and
more formally, 1990, that growth 
theory got its next big boost. First,
there was the series of famous lectures
by Robert Lucas, the Nobel Prize-
winning economist who brought
rational expectations theory into 
mainstream economics. In his 
lectures, later published as “On the
Mechanics of Economic Develop-
ment,” Lucas refocused discussion on
the importance of human capital accu-
mulation in spurring growth. Then it
was a former student of his, Paul
Romer, now at Stanford University,
who moved the debate forward.
Romer is credited with pioneering
what became known as endogenous
growth theory, though many others
have contributed. It is called the
endogenous growth model because
Romer succeeded in placing techno-
logical change on the model’s inside.
The key to growth in the endoge-
nous growth model is that it 
captures the “externalities” of invest-
ments in human capital. These are 
the byproducts of knowledge, where 
people not only get trained to use, say,
a new computer, but also figure out 
a new, more efficient way to build a
computer. These externalities may 
at first manifest themselves within
individuals and their firms. But
because ideas are “non-rival,” or can be
used by anybody, they eventually spill
out into the wider economy.
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function — this factory for new ideas
— is embedded in the new growth
model. Ideas are both produced and
consumed. This way, the problem of
diminishing returns to capital invest-
ment is overcome. As defined in the
new growth theory, capital investment
is directed in large part to human 
capital, whose ideas have the power to
keep economies growing through 
constant innovation.
Thus, in the endogenous growth
model, policy matters because you can
go about creating incentives for
investments in human capital and
research and development. This can
be done via subsidies for education,
tax rates, and, certainly, beefing up
intellectual property rights.
When Romer’s work came out,
there were protests from many econo-
mists that they understood the
importance of ideas and technical
change all along. But what Romer and
the new growth model made possible
was a framework in which one could
think about how policy affects long-
run growth. In an interview, Romer
says, “The history of economics shows
us that formal mathematical models,
rather than just verbal intuitions,
sharpen our understanding and our
thinking.”
In a way, the basic new growth
model that Romer built is like the part
of the neoclassical model that happens
when an economy is in transition,
before it gets to the steady state. The
transitional period just never ends.
The beauty of the endogenous growth
model is that, theoretically, it seems 
to replicate real-world experience:
Different rates of saving and accompa-
nying investments in capital can
produce different incomes (or eco-
nomic outputs). Additionally, these
resulting different rates of income are
unrelated to differences in returns to
capital. That means that countries
with low incomes wouldn’t necessarily
be those which would be expected to
have higher growth rates, and hence,
be more attractive to capital invest-
ments from foreigners — just as we see
in the world.
Or is it? When economists have
looked to the real world for support of
both neoclassical and endogenous
growth theory, they have often been
disappointed.
Real-World Comparisons
One way economists figure out
whether their models actually work 
is by taking them to the data and 
performing statistical regressions.
They use growth rates as the depend-
ent variable and regress them against,
say, monetary policy. Then they look
for robustness, or whether there is a
strong relationship between growth
and monetary policy across countries.
Such testing on growth theory 
began shortly after the new class of
models was introduced. Among the
leading empirical researchers have
been teams like Robert Barro and
Xavier Sala-i-Martin.
The results haven’t been as encour-
aging as was first hoped. Even in 2006,
it is hard to find strong empirical 
evidence of long-run growth rates
being affected by individual policies.
For example: Growth theory would
single out high-inflation countries as
likely to experience slow growth. But
cross-country regressions do not find a
strong link between high inflation and
lowered economic prosperity, despite
the fairly intuitive connection and 
relative consensus among economists
that policymakers ought to be trying
to lower inflation in order to spur
growth.
How can this be? Cross-country
growth regressions suffer several
inherent problems. Among them, the
variables that economists must use to
stand in for things like tax rates and
political stability are often crude. This
makes it difficult to identify which
variables are most important for cre-
ating the right conditions for growth.
William Easterly, a former World
Bank economist now at New York
University, surveyed empirical growth
studies, including many of his own, for
a 2005 book chapter. These studies
have found links between policy and
growth, with the most widely studied
policies, including fiscal policy, 
inflation, exchange rate management,
and trade. But Easterly questions the
strength of those links.
Tax rates have been the leading 
policy investigated, “yet the literature
has generally failed to find a link
between income or output taxes and
economic growth,” Easterly wrote. For
example, studies in the 1990s seemed
to show that tax rates were not associ-
ated with changes in growth rates.
That is, countries with really high tax
rates weren’t necessarily growing any
slower than countries with lower rates
— precisely the opposite of what
endogenous growth theory predicts. 
To be sure, Easterly concludes that
there is “some statistical association
between national economic policies
and growth,” meaning that growth
theory sometimes provides predic-
tions in line with the data. But he adds
that these associations are not very
robust. To Easterly, this puzzle is
attributable to the difference in trying
to grow something and trying to
destroy something. A nation’s history
and institutions are things that policy 
is largely powerless to overcome.
“Countries that pursue destructive
policies like high inflation, high black-
market premium, chronically high
budget deficits, and other signs of
macroeconomic instability are plausi-
ble candidates to miss out on growth,”
he says. “However, it doesn’t follow
that one can create growth with 
relative macroeconomic stability.”
Different economists have different
views about how big of a problem is
the mismatch between data and 
theory. Do such mismatches render
growth theory useless? Rodolfo
Manuelli, a University of Wisconsin
economist who was one of the original
modelers of new growth theory, grants
that simple versions of the endoge-
nous growth model aren’t supported
by the data. But he believes that has
more to do with the “ad hoc” nature 
of empirical work and the scarcity of 
reliable data than any broad weakness
in new growth theory.
Likewise, Manuelli (as others have
pointed out as well) thinks that 
translating between the model and 
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model might predict market distor-
tions that affect human capital
accumulation can account for cross-
country differences in growth rates,
it’s not clear what those distortions are
in the real world. Are they tax rates?
Are they corrupt governments? “I
don’t think it’s been established that
the theory is a clear success,” Manuelli
says in an interview. “At the same time,
I don’t think that the existing empiri-
cal work shows that it’s a failure.”
Ross Levine, a Brown University
economist, is one of growth litera-
ture’s leading empirical researchers.
His work finds a strong relationship
between the depth of a nation’s finan-
cial sector and its growth rate. But as
far as ties between individual policies
and growth go, the financial sector
seems to be an exception. “It’s not so
much that policies don’t matter,”
Levine says in an interview. “It’s that
policies tend to come as a group.”
In this view, the underlying princi-
ple of endogenous growth theory still
holds. Of course, high inflation is
going to hurt growth. Empirical stud-
ies fail to single out inflation as the
problem because inflation is probably
just one of a host of related policy
problems, from corrupt government
to high government spending relative
to output.
Moreover, a solid understanding of
growth requires more than a simple
observation of how some countries
have done it. A case study of Taiwan
might be useful in illustrating how a
small country with relatively little in
the way of natural resources has 
provided high standards of living 
for its citizens. But it’s not clear 
how much Taiwan’s success can tell 
us about the failures that many 
sub-Saharan African countries, for
instance, have had in their quest for
growth. The interaction of political
forces across countries deeply compli-
cates the search for identifying the
relative importance of technology, 
savings, and institutions, among 
many other variables. Theory can 
help in that search, especially in
understanding the recent experiences
of developed nations like Taiwan. 
But modeling the highly distorted
economies of less-developed nations
is another matter.
Romer Redux
Although he no longer works on
growth models, Paul Romer still
closely follows the literature. The
failure of some empirical studies to
support endogenous growth theory
doesn’t bother him for a couple of
reasons. First, it’s important to dis-
tinguish between “growth” and
“development.” If one defines
“growth” as applying to the rate of
growth of the GDP per capital over
time for already developed nations
such as the United States or
European nations, it is impossible 
to discount the importance of 
knowledge and ideas, Romer says.
Granted, he says, for lesser-developed
countries the debate is open, as 
the “development” literature is
unclear about the importance of the
ideas in helping lesser-developed
countries close the gap with devel-
oped countries.
“In development theory, there’s an
open debate about how important
thinking about ideas is for under-
standing the catch-up process,”
Romer says. “Why do some countries
catch up and others do not? I think
this is where people say the [endoge-
nous] theory doesn’t make sense.”
The theory “doesn’t make sense”
in that for underdeveloped nations,
creating incentives for nurturing new
ideas must be viewed at the bottom
of its priority list. More urgent would
have to be creating political stability
as well as political accountability,
enforcement of property rights, and
support for a free market. In the case
of sub-Saharan nations of Africa, 
few would argue that it’s a lack of 
ideas — rather than a lack of a well-
functioning market system — that is
holding back countries from catching
up with the rest of the world.
On the other hand, Romer points
to China as a more complicated case.
In China, there is a fast-growing 
manufacturing economy, fueled by
direct foreign investment. And yet
the nation still lacks a fundamentally
sound market economy. “There’s no
way to understand the Chinese expe-
rience without understanding their
success in taking knowledge from the
rest of the world and putting it to use
in their borders,” Romer says. “So
theories of how ideas get transmitted
and put to use are central to under-
standing the China case.”
Above all, Romer is wary of reject-
ing endogenous growth theory out of
hand based on the failure of empirical
studies to validate all of its versions
and all of its predictions. An example:
Endogenous growth theory teaches
that in a world where countries don’t
interact (don’t trade with each other
or communicate at all), the largest
economies should grow fastest. Atest
of that assumption would find that
it’s not true. But the problem isn’t so
much the theory, Romer says, as the
assumption that was used to test the
theory. “That’s not the same as saying
that knowledge and ideas are unim-
portant in the process,” he says. “It
just means some of the particular
functional forms that people have
used to try to capture the effects of
knowledge are wrong.”
Refinements
Pierre Sarte, an economist at the
Richmond Fed, has written several
papers on growth theory. His most
recent article aims to explain a certain
case when endogenous growth theory
and data seemingly contradict each
other. It is a useful example of how the
relationship between growth theory
and empirical studies ought to be
viewed with some skepticism.
The data seem to show that 
countries with higher average ratios 
of government spending, or average
tax rates, to output are associated 
with higher growth rates. On its face,
this finding is completely at odds 
with what endogenous growth models
say should happen — that high tax
burdens should trigger lower growth
rates. Sarte and co-author Wenli Li
noted first that because marginal 
tax rates are not easily observable,
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rates with tax shares in income (or the
ratio of government spending to
GDP). They attacked this problem by
building a model that more closely
resembled the real world. The authors
used progressive tax rates (where most
endogenous growth models have
relied on flat rates) and “heteroge-
neous agents” (to represent people of
different incomes).
Li and Sarte show that — because
of a Laffer curve-type effect — some
people have lowered incentives to
accumulate human and physical capi-
tal in environments with highly
distortionary tax codes. This in turn
lowers their income, and thus may
cause the overall tax shares in income
to decrease. At the same time, an
environment with a highly distor-
tionary tax code is associated with
lowered growth in the model. So the
end result is that a distortionary tax
code is associated with both lowered
growth rates and lowered tax shares
in income simultaneously. It follows
that, when plotted together, the rela-
tionship between tax shares in
income and growth in the model will
appear to be positive, just as in the
data. But the fact remains that this in
no way implies that taxes don’t have a
distortionary effect.
The overarching conclusion Sarte
draws is that using tax revenue as a
share of output (the average tax rate)
is a poor stand-in for the marginal tax
rate. In other words, the empirical
findings may be sending the wrong
signals because they’re not using the
right measures. “What the paper
points out more generally is to be
careful about interpreting the data,”
Sarte says.
At the same time, Sarte sees a
wider problem for growth theory.
Taxes or other measures that econo-
mists typically use in empirical
studies don’t convey the breadth and
depth of distortionary policies that
are in fact at the heart of slow or neg-
ative growth rates in developing
countries. Similarly, Sarte agrees
with the likes of Easterly and
Manuelli in seeing deficits in the
ability of models to account for
things like property rights or a cor-
rupt legal system. “I find it very
difficult to believe that highly distor-
tionary policies have no effect on
long-run growth prospects,” Sarte
says. “You don’t see that in the data
simply because it’s very difficult to
measure the relevant distortions.”
The Verdict
So we return to the question: Is
growth theory stunted? The apparent
failure of empirical growth literature
to validate theory doesn’t bother 
economists like Manuelli, who see 
distinct roles for theory versus statis-
tical regressions (as well as distinct 
cases where neoclassical theory 
works just fine, and others where
endogenous growth models are more
insightful).
The most valuable contribution 
of pure theory is to answer “what if” 
policy questions that the data, being
based on past policy, cannot address.
By necessity, theory simplifies reality
into a mathematical model. “We 
are sort of in an in-between region
right now,” Manuelli says. “My hunch
is that, in some time, newer, better
versions [of growth theory] will come
closer to encompassing all the 
complexity of actual economies.”
To Levine, there is likewise no need
for alarm. Though empirical work 
hasn’t found clear links between 
individual policies and growth, that
may not be the point. He sees endoge-
nous growth literature’s focus on
asking why countries choose groups of
policies that don’t lead to rapid
growth.
Even if he’s wrong about the pre-
cise direction of growth literature,
Levine is confident that there will 
be another Solow and Romer-like
innovation before long. “The question
is too big and too central to econo-
mists,” Levine says. “With the new
growth theory, there were some new
insight, there was a lot of new data and
this confluence of ideas and data
caused a lot of action in trying to
examine the links between policy and
growth. We learned a lot, and now
people are starting to ask the 
question, ‘Why would countries
choose different types of policies that
don’t lead to growth?’ Maybe that 
will lead us to the next step.” RF
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